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This research attempts to find empirical evidence of ex ante
factors relating to the economic trade-offs that an auditor faces
when deciding whether or not to disclose going concern
uncertainties in an audit report in a non-litigious continental
European setting, Belgium. The research methodology consists
of univariate and logistic regression analysis. The results of
the study confirm the belief that the auditor’s going concern
opinion decision is not only a question of competence but
also of independence. A significant moderating factor appears
to be recent client loss on the part of the auditor. The legal
obligation for Belgian auditors to refer to the report of the
Board of Directors in their own audit report seems to signifi-
cantly influence their reporting behaviour. The disclosure by
the Board of Directors of ‘bad news’ regarding the state of
affairs of a company diminishes any conflict of interest that
may exist between the Board and the auditor. However, no
evidence was found to justify the fear for a ‘self-fulfilling
prophecy’ effect. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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SUMMARY
Auditors’ responsibility for assessing the busi-
ness prospects of their clients has become the
subject of much debate and considerable re-
search. However, nearly all published studies
on the going concern opinion decision focus on
a British–American context. Moreover, the re-
search questions dealt with are themselves still
in debate in the auditing literature and profes-
sion. This study attempts to elaborate on this
area of research and to apply it in a continental
European setting, more specifically in Belgium.
The general expectation for Belgium is that au-
ditors will mention fewer going concern prob-
lems in their audit reports than their
counterparts in the US and the UK. This expec-
tation is based on existing legal and institu-
tional differences between Anglo-Saxon
countries and countries in continental Europe.
Consequently, the question arises of whether
the independence of Belgian auditors is in any
way compromised or whether it is safeguarded
by other incentives. More in particular, this
study attempts to find empirical evidence of ex
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ante factors which may relate to the economic
trade-offs that the auditor is confronted with
and may, therefore, influence his going concern
opinion decision in an environment with low
litigation rates.
The results of the study suggest that auditors
either do not use a bankruptcy prediction
model or that, if they do, it does not influence
their going concern opinion decision. This find-
ing confirms the belief that the auditor’s going
concern opinion decision is not only a question
of competence but also of independence. In-
deed, a factor that appears to significantly mod-
erate the auditor’s going concern opinion
decision is the loss of audit clients in the previ-
ous year. The study also establishes that compa-
nies who have switched auditors are more
likely to receive a going concern uncertainty
disclosure than those who have not. It further
appears that the legal obligation for auditors of
Belgian companies to refer to the annual report
of the Board of Directors in their audit report
has a significant impact on the auditor’s report-
ing behaviour. This finding confirms the expec-
tation that any mention of ‘bad news’
concerning the state of affairs of a company on
the part of its Board of Directors will diminish
the conflict of interests between the Board and
the auditor. Finally, no evidence was found of
the much-feared self-fulfilling prophecy effect.
INTRODUCTION
Auditors’ responsibility for assessing the busi-
ness prospects of their clients has become the
subject of much debate and considerable re-
search. However, nearly all published studies
on the going concern opinion decision focus on
a British–American context. Moreover the re-
search questions dealt with are themselves still
in debate in the auditing literature and profes-
sion. The current study attempts to elaborate on
this research topic and to apply it in a continen-
tal European setting, more specifically in
Belgium.
Exploring Belgian data is an interesting exer-
cise, as Belgian audit legislation is unique in at
least two respects. First, auditors in Belgium are
hired for a period of 3 years, rather than just 1
year as in the US and the UK. Second, an
auditor in Belgium is obliged to explicitly men-
tion in his audit report whether the annual
report of the Board of Directors contains all the
information required by law and whether it is
in accordance with the annual financial state-
ments. Besides these peculiar features of Belgian
audit legislation, the Belgian audit environ-
ment—as that in most continental European
countries—is relatively non-litigious compared
to that in Anglo-Saxon countries.
On the basis of legal and institutional differ-
ences between an Anglo-Saxon setting and con-
tinental Europe, one would generally expect
Belgian auditors to indicate fewer going con-
cern problems in their audit reports than their
counterparts in the UK or the US. However, the
question also arises of whether the indepen-
dence of Belgian auditors is perhaps compro-
mised or whether it is safeguarded by other
incentives. In particular, this study sets out to
find empirical evidence of ex ante factors which
may relate to the economic trade-offs that the
auditor faces and which may, therefore, influ-
ence the auditor’s going concern opinion deci-
sion in an environment with low litigation rates.
Implemented on 1 January 1998, the revised
Belgian Bankruptcy Act, which aims at increas-
ing the auditor’s responsibility by transforming
his going concern assessment from a negative to
an affirmative duty, may be regarded as an
expression of the growing interest in recent
years for the auditor going concern opinion
issue.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
It would appear that the question of how the
auditor arrives at a going concern decision is, in
the first place, a matter of personal competence.
Most behavioural studies (based on question-
naires, experiments and archival data) confirm
the competence hypothesis, as they indicate that
auditors seem to be quite able to identify prob-
lem companies (e.g. Kida, 1980; Campisi and
Trotman, 1985; Citron and Taffler, 1992; Barnes
and Den Huan, 1993). Problem company criteria
include: the occurrence of debt rescheduling or
reorganization; an inability to meet interest pay-
ments; reporting of operational losses, bottom
line losses or negative retained earnings for a
second or third consecutive year. However,
these studies show that, after having identified
a problem company, other factors ultimately
determine whether or not a going concern qual-
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ification is made. Kida (1980) was the first to
suggest that a comparison between bankruptcy
prediction model accuracy and the rendering of
going concern audit reports may be confounded
by extraneous variables. His evidence supports
the view that the identification of a going con-
cern problem is separated from the decision to
actually disclose these uncertainties in the audit
report. The auditor’s decision to render a going
concern qualification does not appear to depend
solely on the recoverability of assets, as profes-
sional standards would suggest, nor does it
depend on a set of ratios designed to predict
bankruptcy. Kida’s results indicate that the pos-
sible consequences of the issuance or non-is-
suance of the going concern audit report may
also influence the auditor. In other words, the
audit going concern opinion decision is not only
a question of competence, but also of
independence.
De Angelo (1981b) defines audit quality as
‘the market-assessed joint probability that a
given auditor will both discover a breach in the
client’s accounting system and report the
breach’. Obviously, the first condition depends
on the auditor’s technical or professional capa-
bilities whereas the second depends on the au-
ditor’s independence. In other words, an audit
report is deemed of value if it results from both
a technically competent and independent audit
process (Citron and Taffler, 1992). The fact that
an auditor might believe that a firm is going to
fail and yet decides not to disclose this opinion
implies that disclosure most likely depends
upon: (i) the auditor’s prediction of failure; and
(ii) the utility function of the auditor regarding
the disclosure of the results of that prediction.
For this reason, it is suggested in the analytical
accounting literature that auditor decision-mak-
ing probably involves economic trade-offs, such
as the cost of losing a client, the expected cost of
being exposed to third-party lawsuits, and the
anticipated cost of loss of reputation (De An-
gelo, 1981a; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986;
Louwers, 1998).
This study attempts to find empirical evi-
dence of ex ante factors relating to the economic
trade-offs that the auditor faces and that may
influence his going concern opinion decision. In
this way, potential situations can be identified
in which the auditor’s independence may be
compromised.
GOING CONCERN, LEGISLATION,
ROLE OF THE AUDITOR
Belgian bookkeeping law states that valuation
rules should be formulated from the viewpoint
of the going concern principle (Article 16 KB, 8
October 1976). It also states that, from the mo-
ment that an entity is unable to continue as a
going concern, valuation rules must be adapted,
and the assets and liabilities assessed at their
expected liquidation value. Since the valuation
rules are laid down by the Board of Directors, it
is their responsibility to determine whether or
not the entity may be considered as a going
concern. Besides Belgian bookkeeping law, Bel-
gian company law also contains two articles
relating to the going concern of an entity. The
first article (103, Alarmprocedure) states: ‘If net
assets
1 are less than 50% of the subscribed capi-
tal, the Board of Directors is required to con-
vene the members of the General Meeting, who
must decide on the basis of the Board’s reorgan-
isation plans whether or not to continue the
entity. The diagnosis should take into account
the specific characteristics of the entity at the
closing date of the financial year, as well as
events between this closing date and the date
on which the Boards of Directors approves the
annual statements and submits them to the
General Meeting’. The second article (104) says
that ‘if net assets are below the minimal amount
stated in article 29, i.e. BEF 1,250,000, any inter-
ested party may appeal to the court to dissolve
the company’. In addition, the Belgian Institute
of Auditors issued the following non-binding
circular letter (C.007:82, 19 November 1982),
outlining recommended practice with regard to
companies with a going concern problem:
‘1. If the auditor ascertains serious circum-
stances that may jeopardise the financial stabil-
ity of the company, he should make sure that
the direction of the company is aware of the
gravity of the situation. If necessary, the auditor
may prompt the bodies that bear legal and
statutory responsibility to adopt a position;
2. The auditor should make sure that the com-
pany complies with articles 103 and:or 104 of
company law if applicable;
3. The auditor should make sure that the Gen-
eral Meeting is correctly informed about the
financial position of the company. If the annual
report of the Board of Directors provides the
required explanations, the auditor may refer to
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it without qualifying his report. Conversely, if it
is not possible to make a clear judgement about
the financial position on the basis of the annual
report or if the auditor, despite the arguments
of the Directors, is not quite certain that the
company will be able to continue its operations
until the end of the following financial year, a
qualified opinion may be called for;
4. The auditor should issue a disclaimer of
opinion if article 40 of the law on bookkeeping
has not been complied with, i.e. when the com-
pany has stopped meeting its obligations as
they become due or if it owes its survival to
fictitious credit’.
Since the implementation of the revised Bel-
gian Bankruptcy Act on 1 January 1998, an
auditor who has substantial doubts about the
continued existence of a company is required to
report this to the Board of Directors. If the
Board of Directors does not come up with an
appropriate reorganization plan, the auditor
must inform the Court of Commerce and dis-




Anglo-Saxon Countries versus Continental
European Countries
Generally speaking, auditors in continental Eu-
ropean countries are assumed to be more reluc-
tant to express going concern uncertainty in
audit reports than their counterparts in Anglo-
Saxon countries. This assumption stems from
the major differences that exist between the
legal and institutional environments of conti-
nental Europe and the Anglo-Saxon world.
More specifically, it is believed that differences
in capital markets, relations between capital
providers and firms, and dissimilarities be-
tween the legal systems may affect auditors’
going concern opinion decisions. High capital
market financing rates characterize the Anglo-
Saxon world, while in continental European
countries companies tend to be financed by
banks (Nobes and Parker, 1991). Moreover, it
appears that banks keep a lot of companies
artificially alive by not cutting off credit lines.
Indeed, termination of credit on the part of
banks is an unusual course of action that is
generally only resorted to if the financial situa-
tion of the company is extremely bad (Martin,
1997). Shareholders, however, tend to be much
more eager than banks to withdraw their
money from a company in financial trouble. As
a result, the risk of bankruptcy and conse-
quently the probability that the auditor will be
confronted with a client going out of business
may be lower in continental Europe than in the
Anglo-Saxon world. In addition, shareholders
generally have less access than banks to internal
company information. Consequently, there may
be greater need in countries with high capital
financing rates for certified financial statements
and, in particular, for the disclosure of going
concern uncertainty by an independent auditor
(Nobes and Parker, 1991). Finally, litigation
rates in continental Europe are much lower than
in Anglo-Saxon countries (Kinney, 1994; Gietz-
mann and Quick, 1998). Countries where litiga-
tion is relatively uncommon tend to have
government-prescribed accounting standards
that are rather conservative, while banks or the
government are the major providers of capital
(Mueller et al., 1994). In this sense, Belgium is a
typical continental European country: account-
ing is governed by laws and banks play a
central role in corporate financing (Lefebvre
and Flower, 1994).
Another element contributing to the expecta-
tion that continental European auditors will
generally be more reluctant to disclose going
concern uncertainty in their audit report is the
fact that auditing guidelines on going concern
assessment in most continental European coun-
tries are rather subjective, general and ambigu-
ous. However, some countries in continental
Europe have recently revised their audit stan-
dards after the example of the US, which in
1988 replaced SAS No. 34, on ‘the auditor’s
considerations when a question arises on an
entity’s continued existence’, with SAS No. 59.
The main consequence of the change of stan-
dard is that the task of assessing a company’s
ability to continue as a going concern has been
transformed from a negative into an affirmative
duty. According to SAS No. 34, an auditor
should not, in the normal course of an audit,
search for information about the continued exis-
tence of the entity under audit. The new SAS
No. 59, by contrast, requires the auditor to
evaluate in every audit whether there is substan-
tial doubt about the entity’s ability to continue
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as a going concern for a reasonable period of
time, i.e. 1 year. However, SAS No. 59 clearly
does not make auditors responsible for predict-
ing future events, nor does it require auditors to
perform more procedures than they used to.
IFAC revised its International Standard on
Auditing with respect to the going concern is-
sue (ISA 23) for the third time in 1994. With
respect to the responsibility of the auditor, ISA
23 states that: ‘When planning and performing
audit procedures and in evaluating the results
thereof, the auditor should consider the appro-
priateness of the going concern assumption un-
derlying the preparation of the financial
statements’. This contrasts to the former version
of the standard, which merely required the au-
ditor to take into account during the audit the
possibility that the going concern assumption,
on the basis of which the annual statements are
drawn up, may be questioned.
The audit professions in other countries, such
as the UK and the Netherlands, have changed
their standards too, so that they now more or
less correspond with ISA 23. Germany is still
lagging behind, since no change has been made
until now with respect to the auditor’s responsi-
bilities for reporting going concern uncertain-
ties. France, by contrast, also significantly
increased the auditor’s responsibilities in terms
of reporting going concern uncertainties. The
French model served as an example for Bel-
gium’s revised Bankruptcy Act of 1 January
1998, which should likewise increase auditors’
responsibilities in relation to going concern as-
sessment (see Going Concern, Legislation, Role
of the Auditor’ section).
Auditor Competence
As argued above, auditor decision-making in
the presence of going concern uncertainties may
be characterized as a two-stage process. The
auditor will first recognize that a company has
a potential going concern problem. After recog-
nizing the problem status of the company, he
will decide whether or not a going concern
modification is appropriate. At each stage of
this decision-making process, the auditor will
focus on certain cues or variables that will help
him to make a judgement. With reference to the
definition of audit quality, one can say that
identifying a company with going concern
problems is a question of competence, while
deciding to disclose the going concern uncer-
tainty is a question of independence. Auditor
competence and independence are interdepen-
dent dimensions of the audit process and are
difficult to separate out. Therefore, the research
questions that are put forward here focus on the
combined presence of competence and
independence.
First, it would be interesting to determine
how great the likelihood of failure must be for
the auditor to conclude that disclosure of a
going concern uncertainty is inevitable, irre-
spective of the question of auditor indepen-
dence. In other words: ‘What is the relationship
between the likelihood of client failure and the
type of audit report issued?’ From the view-
point of auditor competence, one may expect
that the higher the likelihood of failure, the
more straightforward the judgement as to
whether a client is suffering going concern
problems. In this respect, it might be possible to
find a certain cut-off point. It is hence hypothe-
sized that:
H1: The higher the probability of failure on the
part of a company on balance sheet date, the
less likely it is to receive an unqualified audit
report.
In addition to the probability of failure, it
may be interesting to consider another variable
that is likely to be related to financially stressed
enterprises. This variable is the time lag be-
tween the balance sheet date and the submis-
sion date of the annual accounts and audit
report to the Belgian National Bank. Under Bel-
gian Company Law, the directors of a company
are required to present the annual accounts to
the shareholders within 6 months from the bal-
ance sheet date. The annual accounts and the
audit report must either be sent to the share-
holders or they must be available for consulta-
tion within the company for at least 15 days
before the Annual General Meeting. The annual
accounts and the audit report have to be sub-
mitted to the Belgian National Bank within 30
days of the Annual General Meeting.
Anglo-Saxon authors (e.g. Ashton et al., 1987)
attach a great deal of importance to the timeli-
ness of accounting information in general and
audit delay in particular. Caution is called for,
however, because audit delay may be due to a
difference in procedure and national legislation.
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The Australian Stock Exchange, for example,
suspends companies from trading on the
grounds of non-compliance with timeliness re-
quirements. In other words, there is an incen-
tive for companies not to delay submission of
their annual accounts. In Belgium, on the other
hand, no special timeliness requirements are
imposed for listed firms. Usually, there is no
external pressure on the auditors to work as
quickly as possible, nor is there an incentive for
firms to submit their annual accounts at the
earliest possible date. As a result, auditors are
usually able to perform their work according to
urgency, client pressure, personal preferences or
anticipated difficulties. This may totally disrupt
the importance that Anglo-Saxon authors attach
to timeliness and audit delay and may cast a
completely different view on the relevance of
external reporting (De Ceuster and Trappers,
1993). Nevertheless, problem companies may
still be expected to delay submission of their
annual accounts at the Belgian National Bank.
Therefore, the question arises: ‘What is the rela-
tionship between the submission delay for the
annual accounts and the audit report on the one
hand, and the type of audit report issued on the
other?’ In our research, a distinction is made
between ‘general meeting delay’ and ‘submis-
sion lag’. The term ‘general meeting delay’
refers to a delay in the presentation of the
annual accounts and the audit report to the
shareholders, while ‘submission lag’ refers to a
delay in the submission of the annual accounts
and the audit report to the Belgian National
Bank. The related hypotheses are formulated as
follows:
H2.1: The likelihood of an unqualified audit
report decreases if the annual accounts and the
audit report are not presented by the Board of
Directors to the shareholders within 6 months
of the balance sheet date.
H2.2: The likelihood of an unqualified audit
report decreases if the annual accounts and the
audit report are not submitted to the Belgian
National Bank within 30 days of the annual
general meeting.
Economic Trade-offs
As stated above, an audit report only has value
if the auditor is capable of discovering a breach
in the client’s accounting system and will subse-
quently report it. Therefore, given that the audi-
tor is competent, the economic interest of the
auditor in a client and the type of audit report
issued in case of going concern uncertainty
need to be explored. Indeed, the going concern
opinion decision seems to involve economic
trade-offs with, for example, the risk of losing a
client, the risk of being exposed to third-party
lawsuits, and the risk of loss of reputation (De
Angelo, 1981a; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986;
Louwers, 1998). By reviewing the literature, we
succeeded in identifying the following ex ante
factors that may relate to the economic trade-
offs that the auditor is confronted with and that
may, therefore, influence his going concern
opinion decision: litigation, reputation, fear for
the self-fulfilling prophecy and audit loss.
Litigation
Litigation will not be taken into account, since
the threat of litigation is assumed to have only
a marginal impact on the Belgian auditor’s in-
dependence, given the low litigation rates in
continental European countries.
Reputation
Reputation appears to be a factor that may
enhance auditors’ independence. De Angelo
(1981b) asserts that financial statement users
have difficulties assessing the quality of an au-
dit. As a result, financial statement users will
develop observable proxies that are associated
with audit quality. Audit firm size and reputa-
tion are examples of such proxies. Empirical
research has shown that audit firms involved in
disciplinary action tend to loose market share
relative to their competitors (Wilson and Grim-
lund, 1990). Since disciplinary action is very
rare in the present Belgian business context, this
criterion cannot be used to evaluate reputation.
Therefore, reputation will be proxied by audit
firm size. This leads to the following research
question: ‘What is the relationship between the
size of the audit firm and the type of audit
report issued?’ The underlying assumption is
that Big 6 audit firms will deliver better quality
(e.g. De Angelo, 1981b; Palmrose, 1986; David-
son and Neu, 1993). On the one hand, this
implies that Big 6 audit firms are more capable
of discovering a breach in the client’s account-
ing system, and on the other, that they will
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report the breach more easily. The latter could
be due to their concern that if the discovery of
an unreported breach is made public, their rep-
utation will be affected. Therefore, it is hypothe-
sized that:
H3: Companies that are audited by Big 6 audit
firms experience a lower rate of unqualified
audit reports than a matched group of compa-
nies audited by non-Big 6 audit firms.
Self-fulfilling Prophecy
According to the ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ argu-
ment, a qualified audit report for going concern
uncertainty may actually bring about client fail-
ure because of its impact on current as well as
prospective investors, creditors, suppliers and
customers. In other words, it is argued that ‘the
auditor’s early warning could itself be the prox-
imate cause of bankruptcy’ (Elliot and Jacobson,
1987). It appears from anecdotal evidence that
Belgian auditors, too, seem to believe in the
self-fulfilling prophecy
2. However, in the lim-
ited number of archival Anglo-Saxon studies,
no evidence has been found to support this
assumption (e.g. Citron and Taffler, 1992;
Nogler, 1995). Clearly, it would be extremely
interesting for the Belgian audit profession to
have conclusive evidence of whether or not the
theory of the self-fulfilling prophecy holds in
practice. This consideration led to the following
research question: ‘Is there evidence to support
the self-fulfilling prophecy hypothesis?’ Given
the strong fear among Belgian auditors for the
self-fulfilling prophecy, it is hypothesized that:
H4: Companies for which going concern uncer-
tainty is disclosed in the audit report in year
t1 will exhibit a higher rate of bankruptcy in
year t than a matched group of companies for
which going concern uncertainty is not dis-
closed in the audit report in year t1.
Audit Loss
Audit loss may occur if a client goes bankrupt
or switches auditors, among other things. In
this respect, we believe the factor audit loss to
be related to the above-mentioned factor, i.e. the
fear of the self-fulfilling prophecy. The possibil-
ity that the client might dispose of one auditor
and switch to another if disclosure is made of a
breach on the part of management is yet an-
other factor that compromises the auditor’s in-
dependence. The existing empirical Anglo-
Saxon evidence on the connection between au-
dit report qualifications and auditor switching,
however, is contradictory (e.g. Chow and Rice,
1982; Menon and Schwartz, 1985; Craswell,
1988; Haskins and Williams, 1988; Krishnan,
1994; Lennox, 1998). In contrast to Anglo-Saxon
countries, auditors in Belgium are hired for a
period of 3 years. After this period, their man-
date may be renewed, but in the meantime they
can only be dismissed under very exceptional
circumstances. This raises certain questions, in-
cluding whether the threat of auditor switching
is less significant in a Belgian context. Since the
threat of client switching to the incumbent audi-
tor cannot be observed, we tried to establish
whether companies that do switch auditors are
more likely to receive a clean audit. In other
words, we were interested to find out whether
there is any evidence to suggest that companies
successfully use auditor switching in order to
avoid receiving unclean audit reports (so-called
‘opinion-shopping’). This leads to the following
research question: ‘What is the relationship be-
tween auditor switching and audit report quali-
fications?’ Given the contradictory results of
previous research, no direction is posited for the
ensuing hypothesis:
H5.1: Companies that changed auditors are not
more likely to receive an unqualified audit re-
port than a matched group of companies that
did not change auditors.
A concept closely related to that of auditor
switching is tenure. Tenure refers to the length
in years of the auditor–client relationship. One
might expect that the longer the relationship
between the auditor and the client, the more
likely that the auditor will issue an unqualified
opinion. This expectation is based on the belief
that long tenure can potentially affect auditor
independence. Therefore, it is hypothesized
that:
H5.2: Companies that have a longer relationship
with their auditor are more likely to receive an
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unqualified audit opinion than a matched
group of companies that have a shorter relation-
ship with their auditor.
Another important factor in relation to audit
loss is the economic interest of the auditor in a
client. The economic interest of the auditor in a
client can be measured by looking at the audi-
tor’s expected future revenues from the audi-
tor–client relationship. Therefore, we are
interested in the following research question:
‘What is the relationship between the expected
future revenues from the auditor–client rela-
tionship and the type of audit report issued?’
One may expect that if the loss of audit fee is
significant, auditors may be less likely to issue a
going concern qualification. The related hypoth-
esis is formulated as follows:
H5.3: Companies from which the auditor ex-
pects comparatively high future revenues are
more likely to receive a clean audit report than
a matched group of companies from which the
auditor expects low future revenues.
The economic interest of an audit firm in a
client may also be influenced by recent loss of
other audit clients. Indeed, if the audit firm has
recently lost audit clients, it may be inclined to
minimize the risk of losing more. In other
words, the recent loss of audit clients may in-
crease the economic interest of the audit firm in
their remaining clients. We, therefore, formulate
the following research question: ‘What is the
relationship between the circumstance of recent
client losses and the type of audit report subse-
quently issued to other clients?’ It is hypothe-
sized that:
H5.4: Companies whose auditor has lost clients
recently are more likely to receive an unquali-
fied audit report than a matched group of com-
panies whose auditor has not.
Report of the Board of Directors
One of the characteristics of a Belgian audit
report for a large company
3 is that it must
inevitably refer to the annual report of the
Board of Directors. More specifically, the audi-
tor must indicate whether the annual report
contains all the statutory information and
whether it is in accordance with the annual
statements. As a rule, the annual report of the
Board of Directors comments clearly on the
company’s status as a going concern, as it must
contain a statement concerning anticipated de-
velopments within the concern. The role of the
auditor is still limited in this respect. All he can
do is report whether all the information re-
quired by law has been disclosed. If certain
information is lacking, the auditor must take
note. He cannot, however, provide the missing
data personally. Given the fact that an auditor
in Belgium has to refer to the annual report of
the Board of Directors, it may be interesting to
consider the following research question: ‘What
is the influence of the annual report of the
Board of Directors on the audit report with
respect to the going concern audit opinion deci-
sion?’ It would appear that two statutory para-
graphs of the board’s annual report may be
particularly relevant in this respect, i.e. para-
graph 2 ‘important events after the closing of
the fiscal year’ and paragraph 3 ‘circumstances
which can influence significantly the develop-
ment of the company’. Besides these two para-
graphs, another potentially important element is
the mentioning in the Annual Report of the
Board of Directors that article 103 or 104 of
Belgian Company Law (see ‘Going Concern,
Legislation, Role of the Auditor’ section) are
applicable. Furthermore, annual reports of the
Board of Directors can provide additional infor-
mation besides that required by law. A distinc-
tion may be made between three types of
additional information: general information on
the economic situation, description of the
prospects for the company and description of
actions and:or measures that will be taken.
The question arises whether the presence of
some or all of these elements in the annual
report of the Board of Directors has any influ-
ence on the reporting behaviour of the auditor.
From the viewpoint of the auditor, one might
expect it to be the case that if the board’s annual
report contains ‘bad news’, either in the para-
graphs prescribed by law or in the supplemen-
tary information, the auditor will be more
inclined not to issue an unqualified audit re-
port. If the Board of Directors recognizes the
precarious state of affairs of the company and
decides to disclose it in its annual report, there
may no longer be a conflict of interests between
itself and the auditor. On the other hand, one
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could argue that if the annual report of the Board
of Directors contains ‘bad news’, there is no
reason for the auditor to reiterate this informa-
tion in his audit report. The auditor’s duty with
respect to the annual report of the Board of
Directors is indeed restricted to reporting
whether all the information required by law is
included in it and whether it corresponds with
the financial statements. However, we would
expect the first argument to take precedence.
Therefore, the following hypotheses are
formulated:
H6: The inclusion of the second paragraph of the
annual report of the Board of Directors ‘Impor-
tant events after the closing of the fiscal year’
increases the likelihood of an ‘unclean’ audit
report.
H7: The inclusion of the third paragraph of the
annual report of the Board of Directors ‘Circum-
stances which can influence significantly the
development of the company ’ increases the
likelihood of an ‘unclean’ audit report.
H8:Theinclusionofadditionalinformationinthe
annual report of the Board of Directors increases
the likelihood of an ‘unclean’ audit report.
H9: The inclusion of article 103 or 104 in the
annual report of the Board of Directors increases
the likelihood of an ‘unclean’ audit report.
With the revision of the Belgian Bankruptcy
Act, implemented on 1 January 1998, the Belgian
legislator introduced a new obligation for the
Board of Directors: ‘If a company experiences
negative retained earnings or a bottom line loss
for the second year running, then the Board of
Directors should motivate why it should con-
tinue to be allowed to formulate valuation rules
from the perspective that activities will be contin-
ued’. It is the auditor’s duty to see to it that this




The empirical analysis in this paper is con-
ducted on the basis of three samples taken
from the September 1996 and September 1997
versions of the CD-ROM containing the an-
nual accounts that companies submitted to the
Belgian National Bank.
The first sample was drawn from the entire
population of large Flemish companies that
went bankrupt in 1996. The second sample
contains financially stressed non-bankrupt
large Flemish companies. Hopwood et al.
(1994) emphasize the importance of distin-
guishing between financially stressed and non-
stressed firms when examining the auditor
going concern opinion decision. On the basis
of common criteria in the literature (Kida,
1980; Mutchler, 1985; Hopwood et al., 1994), a
company is considered to be financially
stressed if it has either experienced a negative
working capital in the current year or suffered
an operational loss, a bottom line loss, or neg-
ative retained earnings in the current year or
the previous 2 years. Since the working capital
of companies is not disclosed on the CD-
ROM, another indicator to trace problems of
liquidity is used, namely the quick ratio. The
criterion of a negative working capital is con-
sequently replaced with a quick ratio smaller
than 1. The third sample is a control sample
and contains financially non-stressed non-
bankrupt large companies. Menon and
Schwartz (1985) emphasize the importance of
matching control groups of companies by
year, industry and size. Therefore, the three
samples were matched by year (fiscal year
1995), industry (using NACE-BEL codification)
and size (based on turnover). The audit report
and the report of the Board of Directors were
collected and examined for each company of
the samples.
The dependent binary variable is ‘going
concern uncertainty disclosure’ (coded 1 in
case going concern uncertainty is disclosed in
the audit report). In this respect, audit opin-
ions were first categorized into the following
two groups: unqualified opinions (‘clean’ audit
reports) and other opinions (qualified, dis-
claimer or adverse opinion). Within the group
of other than unqualified opinions a distinc-
tion was made between audit reports which
disclose going concern uncertainty and audit
reports which do not disclose going concern
uncertainty. Table 1 illustrates the sample pro-
portions and the type of audit reports issued.
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Table 1. Sample proportions and the type of audit reports issued
Fiscal year 1995 Sample Total
(n303)
Bankrupt firms Stressed firms Non-stressed firms
(n101) (n101) (n101)
Unqualified audit report 44 (43.6%) 69
a (68%) 96 (95%) 209
Other than unqualified audit report: 94
because of going concern uncertainty 26 (25.7%) 18 (18%) 0 (0%) 44
because of other reasons 31 (30.7%) 14 (14%) 5 (5%) 50
a It should be noted that in six out of a total of 69 audit reports going concern problems were mentioned, although the
auditor defined his report as being unqualified.
Model Variables and Measurement
Table 2 provides an overview of the dependent
and explanatory variables and the way in which
they are measured.
Methodology
Each of the suggested explanatory variables will
first be tested in a univariate way to see
whether there are significant differences be-
tween companies with an audit report in which
going concern uncertainty is disclosed and com-
panies with an audit report in which going
concern uncertainty is not disclosed.
Since the explanatory variables do not follow
a normal distribution, the univariate tests are
performed using the non-parametric Mann–
Whitney test.
To assess the incremental contribution of each
variable in the auditor’s going concern opinion
decision, the explanatory variables will subse-
quently be tested in a multivariate way.
Therefore, a logistic regression model will be
developed, given the relative non-normality of
financial ratios (Hopwood et al., 1991) and the
special estimation problems related to binary
dependent variables (Maddala, 1983). The speci-









International Differences in Going Concern
Uncertainty Disclosures
Of the 101 Flemish companies that went
bankrupt in 1996, only 25.7% received an other
than unqualified audit report because of going
concern uncertainties. If one compares this per-
centage with that observed in similar studies in
the US (e.g. Koh, 1991; Raghunandan and
Rama, 1995; Carcello et al., 1997), it appears that
the proportion of bankrupt companies with a
going concern qualification in the US is much
higher: it ranges from 39% to 54% (prior to SAS
No. 59). This finding confirms the expectation
that auditors in continental European countries
are more reluctant to express going concern
uncertainty in their audit report than those in
the US. Similar studies in the UK (e.g. Peel,
1989; Citron and Taffler, 1992) show that the
proportion of bankrupt companies with a going
concern qualification in that country is much
lower than in the US, approximating more
closely to the result for Belgium. A possible
explanation for this observation is the fact that
the regulatory and legal environment in the US
provides better safeguards for auditor
independence.
Univariate Analysis
In order to arrive at some tentative observations
concerning group differences, each of the sug-
gested explanatory variables was first tested
univariately. This was intended to reveal
whether there are significant differences be-
tween companies with an audit report in which
going concern uncertainty is disclosed and com-



































































































Table 2. An overview of the dependent and explanatory variables and method of measurement
Variables Description Measurement
Dependent
Going concern uncertainty disclosure in the audit report of client i Binary variable GCUDi
GCUDi1 in case going concern uncertainty is disclosed in the audit
report, else GCUDi0
Independent
FINCi Financial condition of company i General discriminant score (D-score) of a popular bankruptcy model
developed for Belgian companiesa
Submission delay of the annual accounts and audit report of company GMDELAYi Binary variable
i to the shareholders The time in months between the balance sheet date and the date of
the annual general meeting: GMDELAYi1 if time in months6; else
GMDELAYi0
SUBMLAGi Submission lag of the annual accounts and audit report of company i Binary variable
The time in days between the date of the annual general meeting and to the Belgian National Bank
the submission date of the annual accounts and audit report to the
Belgian National Bank: SUBMLAGi1 if time in days30; else
SUBMLAGi0
Company i switched to auditor j in the previous period (t1, t2, or SWITCHij Binary variable
t3) SWITCHij1 in case a switch occurred, else SWITCHij0
TENUREij Length of the auditor–client relationship The number of years that auditing firm j has been engaged by client i
Company i has a Big 6 auditor or a non-Big 6 auditor B6NB6i Binary variable
B6NB6i1 in case of a Big 6 auditor, else B6NB6i0
LNFEEi Audit fees are proxied
b by: total assetsoperational revenuesfinan- The natural logarithm of the firm audit fees for client i
cial revenues
Clients lost by audit firm j during the previous year Number of clients (scaled by the annual number of firm clients) lost CLIENTLOSSj
during the previous year (loss; gain)
Information in paragraph 2 of the annual report of the Board of PAR2i Binary variable
PAR2i1 in case important negative events after the closing of the Directors of company i ‘important events after the closing of the fiscal
fiscal year have occurred and are mentioned in the annual report of year’
the Board of Directors, else PAR2i0
Information in paragraph 3 of the annual report of the Board of Binary variable PAR3i
PAR3i1 in case the annual report of the Board of Directors de- Directors of company i ‘circumstances which can influence signifi-
scribes circumstances which can influence significantly the develop- cantly the development of the company’
ment of the company in a negative way, else PAR3i0
Ordinal variable Additional information given in the annual report of the Board of ADINFOi
ADINFOi0 in case no additional information is given; ADINFOi1, Directors of company i:
general information on the economic situation 2 or 3 in case information is given on one, two or three elements,
description of the prospects for the company respectively
description of actions, measures that will be taken
ART103104i Binary variable Application of article 103 or 104 of the Belgian Company Law is
ART103104i1 in case the application of the article(s) is mentioned, mentioned in the annual report of the Board of Directors of company
i else ART103104i0
a The D-score is calculated from the general multiple linear discriminant model (developed for Belgian companies by Ooghe and Verbaere, 1982) consisting of the
following ratios: accumulated profit (loss) & reserves:total liabilities; taxes and social security charges:short-term external liabilities; cash:restricted current assets;
work in progress & finished goods:restricted current assets; short-term financial debts: short term external liabilities. The D-score of the general bankruptcy
prediction model has a prediction accuracy of 75.6% when using the optimal cut-off point of D-score0.1304 (Ooghe et al., 1995).
b In Belgium scales for audit fees, developed by the Belgian Institute for Auditors, are based on the average number of audit working hours, which is considered
to depend on the sum of total assets, operational and financial revenues. It should be noted though that these scales are only indicative and might not correspond
to the actual fees in practice.A. Vanstraelen 52
Table 3. Univariate analysis by grouping variable GCUD (going concern uncertainty disclosure) for the
entire sample
Mann–Whitney U (Asymptotic GCUD sample NGCUD sample
(n252) (n51) significance 1-tailed)
Mean rank Mean rank
(sum of ranks) (sum of ranks)
FINC 67.76 (3456) 169.05 (42 600) 2130 (0.000)
GMDELAY 168.22 (8579) 148.72 (37 477) 5599 (0.0735)
SUBMLAG 163.20 (8323) 149.73 (37 733) 5855 (0.1585)
SWITCH 171.09 (8725.5) 148.14 (37 330.5) 5452.5 (0.003)
TENURE 123.26 (6039.5) 154.09 (38 213.5) 4814.5 (0.01)
B6NB6 145.66 (7428.5) 153.28 (38 627.5) 6102.5 (0.239)
LNFEE 139.86 (7133) 154.46 (38 923) 5807 (0.139)
CLIENTLOSS 166.77 (8171.5) 145.49 (36 081.5) 5205 (0.056)
PAR2 136.26 (6131.5) 134.15 (29 914.5) 4938.5 (0.4255)
PAR3 128.23 (5770.5) 135.76 (30 275.5) 4735.5 (0.2435)
ADINFO 173.38 (7802) 126.65 (28 244) 3268 (0.000)
ART103104 173.51 (7808) 126.63 (28 238) 3262 (0.000)
panies with an audit report in which going
concern uncertainty is not disclosed. The results
of the Kolmogrov–Smirnov test showed very
clearly that the explanatory variables do not
follow a normal distribution. Therefore, the
non-parametric Mann–Whitney test was used
to compare the means of the two independent
groups. Table 3 presents the results of the uni-
variate analysis. The table highlights some basic
differences between the companies that re-
ceived an audit report with a going concern
uncertainty disclosure and companies that did
not. It appears that certainly the financial situa-
tion of the firm, and also a delay in the annual
General Meeting, are significant factors in deter-
mining the likelihood that an auditor will dis-
close going concern uncertainties in the audit
report. Furthermore, it appears that companies
with a going concern uncertainty disclosure
tend to submit their annual accounts and the
audit report to the Belgian National Bank less
swiftly than other companies. However, this
difference is not significant. Table 3 further sug-
gests that the auditor’s propensity to disclose
going concern uncertainties is moderated by
other significant external factors. In particular,
the length of the auditor–client relationship and
the number of clients lost appear to significantly
decrease the auditor’s likelihood to disclose go-
ing concern uncertainties. Companies that
switched auditors appear to be more likely to
receive a going concern uncertainty disclosure
than companies that did not. This result is re-
lated to the finding that high tenure decreases
the likelihood of a going concern uncertainty
disclosure. A more detailed analysis on the
tenure-variable showed that auditors in their
first mandate (first 3 years) with a client are
more willing to disclose going concern uncer-
tainty than auditors whose mandate has been
renewed (x
20.05). In other words, auditors
whose relationship with the client exceeds 3
years are less willing to disclose going concern
uncertainties. However, no significant differ-
ence was found in reporting behaviour between
the first 2 years of the auditor mandate and the
last year of the auditor mandate after which the
client has to decide on whether to continue the
relationship with the auditor. No significant
differences were found between the GCUD
sample and the NGCUD sample for the vari-
ables ‘client’s audit fees’ and ‘type of auditor’.
Finally, Table 3 indicates that the report of the
Board of Directors appears to influence the au-
ditor’s going concern opinion decision. More
specifically, the presence of supplementary in-
formation or article 103:104 of Company Law in
the annual report of the Board of Directors
significantly increases the likelihood that the
auditor will disclose going concern uncertainty.
Logistic Regression Results
While the univariate analysis provides some
useful insights, logistic regression results facili-
tate the assessment of the incremental contribu-
tion of each variable in the auditor’s going
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Table 4. Logistic regression results for the entire sample. Dependent variable:
GCUD (disclosure of going concern problems1)
Variable Parameter estimate S.E. Wald chi-square Significance pB
CONSTANT 0.4149 2.2945 0.0327 0.8565
FINC 0.0097 0.0285 0.1165 0.7329
GMDELAY 0.0047 0.0072 0.4172 0.5183
SUBMLAG 0.0099 0.0041 5.7788 0.0162**
SWITCH 1.1735 0.5762 4.1473 0.0417**
TENURE 0.0302 0.0979 0.0951 0.7578
B6NB6 0.2363 0.5161 0.2097 0.6470
LNFEE 0.2606 0.1631 2.5522 0.1101
CLIENTLOSS 0.0160 0.0083 3.6645 0.0556*
PAR2 0.0298 0.3047 0.0096 0.9221
PAR3 0.2010 0.3342 0.3617 0.5476
ADINFO 0.5971 0.1955 9.3248 0.0023***
ART103104 1.8772 0.4237 19.6258 0.0000***
*** p1%; ** p5%; * p10%.
2 Log likelihood: 182.919; Model chi-square: 51.017; Goodness of fit: 268.638; df: 12; Cox &
Snell—R
2: 0.177; Significance: 0.0000; Nagelkerke—R
2: 0.300; Prediction accuracy: 86.26%.
concern opinion decision. The logistic regres-
sion results are presented in Table 4. The mod-
el’s Chi-square is highly significant, indicating
that the observations are well fit by the model.
This is also illustrated by the high association of
predicted probabilities with observed responses
(86.17% correct).
In contrast to the results of the univariate
analysis, the financial situation of the client
rather surprisingly does not incrementally ex-
plain the auditor’s going concern opinion deci-
sion. Neither does the variable delay in the
annual General Meeting. However, a delay in
the submission of the annual accounts and the
audit report significantly increases the probabil-
ity of a going concern uncertainty disclosure.
The factor that appears to significantly moder-
ate the auditor’s going concern opinion decision
is the loss of audit clients in the previous year.
Consistent with the univariate analysis it is
found that companies that switched auditors
appear to be more likely to receive a going
concern uncertainty disclosure than companies
that did not. This could be an indication that the
length of the auditor–client relationship does
matter in some respect. However, the tenure
variable is not significant. Table 4 further pro-
vides evidence that the annual report of the
Board of Directors has a very strong impact on
the auditor’s going concern opinion decision.
Consistent with the univariate analysis, it is
found that the inclusion of additional informa-
tion and the inclusion of article 103:104 are
highly significant incremental explanatory vari-
ables in the auditor’s going concern opinion
decision.
In order to check whether the results might
be biased due to the inclusion of financially
stressed as well as non-stressed firms, the same
logistic regression was run for the subsample of
bankrupt companies and financially stressed
non-bankrupt companies. The results are pre-
sented in Table 5. If one compares Tables 4 and
5, one notes that the findings are similar, except
for the variable client’s audit fees, which ap-
pears in the subsample analysis to be a signifi-
cant moderating factor in the auditor going
concern opinion decision.
Supplemental Analysis
In order to examine whether there is any evi-
dence of a self-fulfilling prophecy effect, a sup-
plemental analysis was carried out. More
specifically, a logistic regression model was de-
veloped with the state of the firm (bankrupt1,
financially stressed non-bankrupt0) as the de-
pendent variable. The explanatory variables
contain the three suggested variables relating to
the likelihood of failure (FINC, GMDELAY,
SUBMLAG), as well as the GCUD variable,
which is of main interest in this analysis. The
variables which relate to the annual report of
the Board of Directors (PAR2, PAR3, ADINFO,
ART103:104) are also included with a view to
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Table 5. Logistic regression results for the subsample bankrupt companies and
financially stressed non-bankrupt companies. Dependent variable: GCUD (disclo-
sure of going concern problems1)
Variable Parameter estimate S.E. Wald chi-square Significance pB
CONSTANT 1.4837 2.3835 0.3875 0.5336
FINC 0.0063 0.0328 0.0364 0.8486
GMDELAY 0.0021 0.0078 0.0728 0.7873
SUBMLAG 0.0102 0.0043 5.5120 0.0189**
SWITCH 1.2204 0.6051 4.0680 0.0437**
TENURE 0.0684 0.1037 0.4346 0.5097
B6NB6 0.1238 0.5545 0.0499 0.8233
LNFEE 0.3347 0.1791 3.4915 0.0617*
CLIENTLOSS 0.0212 0.0095 4.9447 0.0262**
PAR2 0.1037 0.3093 0.1124 0.7374
PAR3 0.3394 0.3499 0.9407 0.3321
ADINFO 0.4211 0.1946 4.6815 0.0305**
ART103104 1.3095 0.4258 9.4572 0.0021***
*** p1%; ** p5%; * p10%.
2 Log likelihood: 161.502; Model chi-square: 33.085; Goodness of fit: 173.275; df: 12; Cox &
Snell—R
2: 0.173; Significance: 0.0009; Nagelkerke—R
2: 0.257; Prediction accuracy: 81.61%.
assessing the influence of the annual report of
the Board of Directors on the likelihood of fail-





where STATEilegal status of the company;
binary variable (STATEi1, in case of
bankruptcy, else STATEi0).
The results of the logistic regression are pre-
sented in Table 6. As one can deduce from
Table 6, the disclosure of a going concern uncer-
tainty in the audit report does not significantly
increase the likelihood that the company will go
bankrupt. Variables which do appear to have a
significant incremental explanatory power are a
delay of the general meeting as well as a delay
in the submission of the annual accounts and
the audit report to the Belgian National Bank.
The contents of the annual report of the Board
of Directors seem to have a significant influence
on the likelihood of bankruptcy. In particular
the disclosure of additional information and the
disclosure of article 103:104 are significant in-
cremental explanatory variables. Surprisingly,
the financial situation of the client is not signifi-
cant. This may be due to the fact that the
bankruptcy prediction model predicted that
66% of the sample consisting of financially
stressed non-bankrupt firms would fail.
CONCLUSIONS
A comparison of the proportion of bankrupt
companies with a going concern uncertainty
disclosure in the audit report in the US, the UK
and Belgium shows that the proportion in the
US is much higher than that in either Belgium
or the UK. A possible explanation for this obser-
vation is the fact that the regulatory and legal
environment in the US provides better safe-
guards for auditor independence. However, fur-
ther research in various countries is needed in
order to assess the impact of increasing the
auditors’ responsibilities for reporting going
concern uncertainties on their reporting
behaviour.
An auditor’s decision-making in the presence
of going concern uncertainties can be character-
ized as a two-stage process. First, the auditor
should identify a company with going concern
problems, which is a matter of competence, and
subsequently he will have to decide whether or
not to report this finding, which is a matter of
independence. Since auditor competence and
independence are interdependent dimensions of
the audit process and are difficult to separate
out, the research questions that were put for-
ward focus on the joint presence of competence
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Table 6. Logistic regression results for the subsample bankrupt companies and
financially stressed non-bankrupt companies. Dependent variable: STATE
(bankrupt1)
Variable Parameter estimate S.E. Wald chi-square Significance pB
CONSTANT 5.7847 1.2910 20.0785 0.0000***
FINC 0.0059 0.0292 0.0405 0.8406
GMDELAY 0.0254 0.0076 11.3320 0.0008**
SUBMLAG 0.0401 0.0098 16.8008 0.0000***
GCUD 0.5084 0.4387 1.3427 0.2466
PAR2 0.4436 0.2743 2.6145 0.1059
PAR3 0.2659 0.2993 0.7891 0.3744
ADINFO 0.5526 0.1800 9.4204 0.0021***
ART103104 0.2095 0.3966 0.2791 0.5973
*** p1%; ** p5%; * p10%.
2 Log likelihood: 194.000; Model chi-square: 52.198; Goodness of fit: 184.400; df: 8; Cox &
Snell—R2: 0.254; Significance: 0.000; Nagelkerke—R2: 0.339; Prediction accuracy: 73.60%.
and independence. From the viewpoint of audi-
tor competence, it was expected that the higher
the likelihood of failure the higher the probabil-
ity that the auditor would report going concern
problems. However, the logistic regression re-
sults did not provide evidence that the proba-
bility of failure measured by the discriminant
score of the general prediction model incremen-
tally increases the likelihood of going concern
uncertainty disclosure. This finding implies that
the results of a bankruptcy prediction model are
either not used by the auditor or that they do
not influence the auditor’s going concern opin-
ion decision. In addition to the financial condi-
tion of the firm, two other variables were
analysed that are related to the likelihood of
failure: a delay of the general meeting and a
delay in the submission of the annual accounts
to the National Bank. The logistic regression
results provided evidence that companies with
a going concern uncertainty disclosure in their
audit report tend to delay the submission of
their annual accounts to the National Bank
4.
From the viewpoint of auditor independence
this study aimed at finding empirical evidence
of ex ante factors relating to the economic trade-
offs that the auditor faces and that may influ-
ence his going concern opinion decision. The
factor that appears to significantly moderate the
auditor’s going concern opinion decision is the
loss of audit clients in the previous year. It was
also found that companies that switched audi-
tors are more likely to receive a going concern
uncertainty disclosure than companies that did
not. This finding is consistent with the result of
the univariate analysis that indicated that audi-
tors in their first mandate (3 years in Belgium)
from a client are more willing to disclose going
concern uncertainty than auditors whose man-
date has been renewed. However, no significant
difference was found in reporting behaviour
between the first 2 years of the auditor mandate
and the last year of the auditor mandate, after
which the client has to decide whether to renew
the relationship with the auditor. Further re-
search needs to be focused on the impact of
auditor switching on auditor reporting be-
haviour, given the conflicting findings reported
in the existent literature. The logistic regression
results of the subsample analysis further pro-
vided evidence that the higher the expected
future revenues from a client, the lower the
propensity of the auditor to disclose going con-
cern uncertainty.
It further appeared that the legal obligation
for auditors of Belgian companies to refer to the
annual report of the Board of Directors in their
audit report has a significant impact on the
auditor’s reporting behaviour. In particular, it
was found that the presence of additional infor-
mation and the presence of article 103:104 of
Company Law in the annual report of the Board
of Directors are highly significant incremental
explanatory variables in the auditor’s going
concern opinion decision. This finding confirms
the expectation that any mention of ‘bad news’
on the part of the Board of Directors will de-
crease the conflict of interests between itself and
the auditor. Consequently, the auditor’s judge-
ment will be more straightforward, resulting in
Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Audit. 3: 41–57 (1999)A. Vanstraelen 56
a higher probability of going concern uncertainty
disclosure.
Finally, it appears that the disclosure of ‘bad
news’ in the annual report of the Board of
Directors significantly increases the likelihood of
bankruptcy.However,noindicationswerefound
of any so-called self-fulfilling prophecy effect.
The disclosure of going concern uncertainty in a
the audit report does not significantly increase
the likelihood that the company in question will
go bankrupt. We concede that the period studied
between going concern uncertainty disclosure in
the audit report and bankruptcy was only 1 year,
which is rather short. Therefore, it would be
interesting if further research could assess the
potential negative effects of a going concern
uncertainty disclosure over a longer period of
time. In addition, more research is needed to deal
adequately with the issue of a self-fulfilling
prophecy effect, due to the difficulties involved
in disentangling the impact of the going concern
uncertainty disclosure from other indicators of
financial distress.
Consequently, it is valuable to extend this type
of research over a longer period of time to see
whether the results are time-robust.
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2. Belgian auditors defend their reluctance to dis-
close going concern uncertainties in audit reports
by arguing that they are concerned about the
‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ effect. In the words of
Paul Behets, the chairman of the Belgian Institute
of Auditors, ‘every warning could mean the end of
the company and damage all interested parties.
When the management of the company with going
concern problems does not seem to undertake any
actions to restore their financial position, the audi-
tor’s going concern opinion decision becomes even
more sensitive’ (De Financieel Economische Tijd, Au-
gust 1996).
3. A company is defined as being large if the number
of employees exceeds 100 or if more than one of
the following thresholds are exceeded: number of
employees50; sales (excl. VAT)BEF 200 mil-
lion; total assetsBEF 100 million.
4. It is acknowledged that a submission delay is an
ex post observation. However, one may assume
that the auditor is able to assess ex ante when a
company is likely to delay the publication of its
annual accounts. This will be the case when it
becomes obvious during the audit that the man-
agement of the company is reluctant to communi-
cate its precarious financial situation to the public
in general.
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